|
|
|
|
|
| Cho, Yongsung; Konishi, Yoshifumi; Easter, K. William. |
| Our primary concern in this paper is to determine to what extent small communities have difficulty meeting the new stricter 2001 standard for arsenic levels in their drinking water. To do this we survey water users in rural Minnesota communities that had arsenic levels in their water supply exceeding 10 g/L during 2001-2006. Our survey results show that after obtaining complete information concerning the arsenic levels in their drinking water consumers with relatively low levels of arsenic were willing to pay $8-9 annually, while those with high levels of arsenic are willing to pay $15-17 annually. We also found that consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) didn’t vary by community size. Thus, we conclude that compared to compliance costs ($58-327 per capita... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Community/Rural/Urban Development; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7353 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Adachi, Kenji; Konishi, Yoshifumi. |
| Providing quality information on health-threatening contamination incidences can improve consumer welfare, because the consumers can, and often do, take self-protective actions given the information provided. Unfortunately, important contamination information often comes from private or quasi-private sources and the distinction between private and public information is also sometimes ambiguous. Thus, the regulatory authority may need to manage private incentives of providing publicly useful information. There is no lack of literature arguing that supply of public goods is smaller than optimal when provision of those goods are in the hands of private agents seeking their own economic rents. The same argument seems to apply here --- private provision of... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9901 |
| |
|
|
| Konishi, Yoshifumi; Coggins, Jay S.. |
| Little theoretical work has been done previously on the welfare valuation of changes in price and quality when consumers are imperfectly informed. The presence of imperfect information is particularly important in the analysis of averting behaviors. We develop a theoretical welfare measure, called quasi-compensating variation, as a natural extension of compensating variation (CV). We show that this welfare measure offers not only a money metric of the "value of information", but also a means to appropriately evaluate the welfare effects of various policies when consumers are imperfectly informed of water contamination. With a numerical example and our decomposition results (Propositions 2 and 3), we demonstrate that (i) the value of information could... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Consumer/Household Economics. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21395 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
